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Summary findings
[)evarajan, SqLlire,  and Suthiwart-Narueput  focus on two  * Fiscal impact. Applying the private sector
broad questions:  counterfactual would lead the Bank to undertake projects
* What is the proper  role for project evaluation in  with a reasonable case for public intervention, such as
today's world, where countries have reduced major  basic infrastructure, primary education, and rural health.
economic distortions  and are reconsidering the role of  These projects typically share the characteristic that costs
the state?  are borne by the public sector while benefits are enjoyed
* Besides project evaluation, how else can economic  by the private sector. But in the absence of
analvsis ensure high-quality projects?  nondistortionary,  lump sum taxes, there is likely to be a
The authors argue for a shift in the emphasis of project  positive marginal cost of taxation and a premium on
evaluation away from a concern with precise rate of  public income. Since the Bank has not used such a
return calculations to a broader examination  of the  premium and treats public costs and private benefits
rationale for public provision. In this context, three areas  equally, it has systematically overestimated the net
critical for proper project appraisal are the  benefits of these projects.
counterfactual private sector supply response, the fiscal  * Fungi  bility of lending. Project-specific appraisal can
impact, and the fungibility of lending.  at best assess only the rate of return and the acceptability
I Countterfactual  private  sector supply  respontse. Any  of the project  being  appraised.  rhis limitation  is
type of cost-benefit analysis  - be it in the public or the  problematic because the project might have been
private sector - requires the project evaluator to specify  undertaken  even without Bank financing. If that is the
the counterfactual: what would the world have looked  case, the Bank is actually financing some other project-
like in the absence of the project? Since World Bank  one nlot  subject to appraisal by the Bank - that would
projects are public sector projects, the relevant  not have been in the investment program without Bank
counterfactual involves assessing what the private sector  financing. This problem arises because financial resources
would have otherwise provided, and the relevant  are fungible to some extent. One way to alleviate this
magnitude for evaluation purposes is the net  concern is to conduct public expenditure reviews before
contribution  of the public project. Failure to consider  embarking on the appraisal and financing of specific
explicitly the private sector counterfactual during  projects. Furthermore,  financing a portion of the
evaluation biases the lending mix of the Bank away from  government's  sectoral investment program may be more
projects with strong public good characteristics toward  effective than project-specific lending.
projects with private good characteristics.
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"We have  found that the extent to which Isocial cost-benefit  analysis  is]
used and [lhasi  real influence  is not great, even in the World  Bank.  "
Little and Mirrlees, 1991
Given  this assessment  of current  practice  by Little  and Mirrlees, what steps, if any,
should  the World  Bank  take  to put its appraisal  of projects on a firmer analytical  footing?
In addressing  this  question  we steer clear of the finer points of project appraisal -- how to
measure externalities, how to estimate shadow  prices -- and focus instead on two broad
questions:
0  What is the proper role for project evaluation in today's world
where countries  have reduced major economic  distortions and are
reconsidering  the role of the state?
We argue that this change in circumstances  calls for a shift in the emphasis of project
evaluation away from a concern with the precision of rate-of-return calculations to a
broader examination  of the rationale  for and merit of public-sector  provision.
The second  question  also moves  away from a focus on rate-of-return  calculations:
*  Besides  project  evaluation,  how else can economic  analysis be used
to ensure high-quality  projects?
Here we suggest that pre-appraisal,  sectoral  analysis and especially reviews of sectoral
public  expenditure  programns  can contribute  substantially  to the quality  of projects approved
by the World Bank.  We address these two questions in Sections II and III of the paper
respectively. We begin  in Section  I with an assessment  of the conclusion  drawn by Little2
and Mirriees  regarding  the current  state of project evaluation  in the World Bank.  Section
IV offers some concluding  thoughts.
I.  THE CURRENT  STATE  OF PROJEcT  EVALUATION  AT  THE WORLD  BANK
Before turning to a more qualitative assessment, we examine the proportion of
projets ,subiect  to evaluation  and show  how  this has changed over time.  For this we need
to categorize projects according to their year of approval,  that is, when the evaluation,  if
any, was done. Unfortunately,  information  on whether  a project appraisal includes  a rate-
of-return  calculation  or not only becomes  available  on a systematic  basis when the project
is reviewed by the Bank's  Operations EvalU!tion Department at the time of completion
(that is, when the project  loan  is fully  disbursed). Thus, the number of projects for which
we have information falls off dramatically  after 1985 -- from 114 in 1985  to only 5 by
1989. We therefore  confune  the analysis  to the 15-year  period from 1970-85. For obvious
reasons, we also confine the analysis to investment projects -- that is, we exclude all
Structural  and Sectoral Adjustment  Operations, and all Technical Assistance  Operations.
Figure 1 indicates  a significant  drop in the percentage of World Bank investment
projects  subject  to the scrutiny  of a rate-of-return  calculation  -- from almost 70 percent in
1970  to only slightly  more than 40 percent in 1985. Most of the decline occurred in the
1980s. Taking  1980  as the swing year, the average  share of projects subject to economic
analysis  fell from almost  70 percent in the preceding  five years to about 50 percent in the
subsequent  five years. The trend  is confirmed  by the fact that in 1991, 51  % of investment
projects had rate of return calculations  (World  Bank, 1991).3
Figure  1:Projectswlth  IRR. 1970-85
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At least thiree  developments  could explain this phenomenon:
Sectoral Shifts.  Traditionally,  the World Bank  has not calculated rates of
return for projects in the social or financial  sectors.  An increase in the
number  of projects  in these  sectors  could  therefore  explain the declinling  use
of project  analysis. However,  the data do not support this view (see Figure
2).  Sectors  where  rates  of return  are usually  calculated  such as agriculture,
energy,  industry,  telecommunications,  and tranLsport  maintained  (and in fact
increased)  their share in total projects approved in that period.  What has
happened  is  a  within-sector  decline  in  the  use  of  economic  analysis
especially in agriculture, energy, industry, and transport (see Figure 3).
Post-  1985, sectoal shifts  may  have  become  more important  as more of our4
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lending has been allocated to the social sectors and the environment --
almost  20 percent  of lending in 1994  compared with less than 8 percent in
1985.
*  Quality Control.  Prior to  1982 the World Bank had a fairly powerful
Central Projects Department  that set standards for project appraisal and
reviewed the quality of appraisal reports.  After 1982 the function of
quality control was devolved to regional vice presidencies which were
themselves  the producers  of the appraisal reports. The incentives  implicit
in  this organizational  structure were unlikely to encourage the use of
rigorous  appraisal  techniques. At focus groups  on project evaluation, staff
identified  several reasons  for the poor quality of economic  analysis,5
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including (1) pressure to deliver  a given amount of  lending within strict
deadlines, and (2) the lack of anyone to  lobby for the importance of
economic  analysis  (Thieme, 1995).
*  Other  Demands. The decade  of the 1980s saw the emergence  of structural
adjustment operations  as an important  and high-visibility  activity for the
World  Bank. Between  1980-82  and 1986-88  the share of these operations
in total lending increased  from 7 to 24 percent. As a result, some of the
Bank's best economists  became absorbed in macroeconomic  matters and6
attention to the details of investment projects declined. Over time, the
number  of recruits trained in project analysis also declined.
While obviously  judgmental, it appears from the above that shifts in the sectoral
composition  of investment  lending have contributed little to the declining  use of project
analysis  and that the answer  probably  lies more in changes in the degree of central quality
control  and the emergence of other demands on the time of economists.  Interestingly,
these  new  demands  were aimed at removing  the very distortions  that shadow  prices were
intended to correct for.  Furthermore, as we show later, a less distortionary policy
environment is associated with an increased probability of  project success, perhaps
reducing  the need for careful cost-benefit  analysis.
Little and Mirrlees appear to be correct therefore in their view that the extent to
which  project  analysis  is used  at the World  Bank  "is not great." But what about the quality
of the analysis when it is used? Judgements  on this point are difficult to make precisely
because  there is no mechanism  of central  quality  control that could be expected to monitor
performance  on a consistent basis.  Nevertheless,  two comments  can be made, one of
which  is specific  to the approach  advocated  by Little and Mirrlees while the other is more
general.
The specific  point  concerns  the use of distributional  weights and the marginal cost
of public funds.  The evidence is clear: other than in a few experimental exercises
distributional  weights  and the marginal  cost of public funds have not been part of project
analysis  in the World  Bank. Before  asking  why, it is important  to clarify a key difference
between distributional weights and the marginal cost of public funds.  The need for
distributional  weights  arises because  of a concern with distribution  whereas the need for7
the marginal cost of funds arises because of a concern with the efficiency of resource
allocation. To elaborate,  imagine  that in making  its decisions  about public investments  the
government decides to treat a marginal dollar accruing to each and every member of
society as being equally valuable. This by itself is sufficient  justification for the analyst
to ignore  distribution  weights. Marginal  benefits  accruing  to different members  of society
can be aggregated  because they all have the same value. This decision notwithstanding,
one might still want to incorporate  the marginal  cost of public  funds ;hrough a premium
on public  relative  to private  income. Assume  for example  that  at the margin public income
is generated through a distortionary importTariff. Any project that makes a claim on
public income therefore elicits a further increase  in import tariffs. The increased tariffs
will almost  certainly  impose  a cost  through  its impact  on the allocation  of resources, which
ought  to be captured  in the project appraisal. Despite  the conceptual  difference between
the marginal  cost of funds and distributional  weights, the former was widely seen as just
another element of the  system of  distribution weights and arguments for dropping
distributional  weights  came to apply to the marginal  cost of funds as well.
Why did the World Bank drop distributional weights (and by association the
marginal cost of funds)? At least three reasons can be advanced:
*  Subjectivity.  The use of distributional  weights  requires a judgement about
the value of marginal increases  in income to different members  of society
which  staff were extremely  reluctant  to make, even though they recognized
that  the use of equal weights  for everybody  was itself a value judgement.
*  Practicality.  Many staff held the view that the actual task of identifying
who actually benefitted  from a project was overwhelming.8
*  Efficiencv.  A  more  compelling  argument  took  the  view  that,  while
govemrnment  should clearly be concerned about the distribution  of income,
project  selection was not the most efficient  instrument for pursuing  this
goal.  This  argument  would claim  that  it is much more  important  for
example  to  ensure  that  the  broad  allocation  of  public  expenditure  to
different spending categories is more or less right than to worry about who
benefits from every single project.
These  arguments  together  with  the disappearance  of  central  quality  control  and  the
emergence  of  new demands on the time oteconomists  were  sufficient to  ensure  that
distributional weights were never seriously used in the World Bank.  And as noted above
the  marginal cost of funds suffered a similar  fate even though  none of  the arguments
applied directly to the marginal cost of funds, which has a different conceptual rationale.
We will return to this point later.
With distributional weights and the marginal cost of funds abandoned. we might
characterize what remains of project evaluation at the World Bank. therefore,  as the border
price  rule,  discounting,  and  sporadic  use  of  a  standard  conversion  factor.  sectoral
conversion factors being rarely if ever used.  Given this more limited scope,  how good is
the  Bank's  project  analysis?  A general  assessment of quality  is possible thanks  to a
special  review that was undertaken of the 92 investment operations for which  rates of
return  were calculated and that were approved by the World Bank's  Board in 1991.  The
review tried to assess projects according to whether the underlying economic analysis was
consistent  with  the  calculations  embodied  in  the  rate  of  return.  While  obviously
subjective,  this approach rated the quality of project analysis as "good or better"  for 559
percent of the projects, as "marginal or acceptable" for a further 29 percent,  and as "poor"
for the remaining  15 percent (World Bank,  1991).
That the ratings had some content is suggested by a follow-up study four years later
which  looked  at the correlation  between the rankings described  above  and the actual
performance  of the projects (World Bank,  1995).  During implementation,  supervision
reports  routinely provide a judgement on the likelihood that a project will be a failure.
The probability that a project would be considered a failure dropped significantly as the
quality of economic analysis at appraisal rose -- if the project analysis was rated good or
better  the probability of failure was judgedT0  be less than 5 percent whereas it rose to
more than 30 percent if the analysis was rated poor.  Although this exercise is subject to
criticisms of omitted variable bias (e.g.,  the quality of analysis could indicate a competent
project manager), it is the first attempt that we know of to provide some assessment of the
value of good project appraisal.
The same study also updated the 1991 assessment of quality  with the following
results.  Of the 112 projects approved in calendar year 1993 and subject to cost-benefit
analysis,  20  percent  were  rated  good  or  better,  42  percent  were  rated  average  or
acceptable, 25 percent were rated barely acceptable or marginal, and 13 percent were rated
as poor, an outcome not unlike that of the 1991 study.  Given the previous tinding about
the percentage of projects subject to rate-of-return analysis, and the current finding that
little more than half of the appraisals were considered good or better,  we conclude that
only around 25 percent of projects are approved on the basis of satisfactory rate of return
analysis.10
II.  PRoJEcT  EVALUATION FOR THE 1990S
Given the disappointing assessment  of current practice, how can we improve
matters? Two steps  seem  worth pursuing  -- a more rigorous assessment  of the underlying
rationale  for public sector intervention,  and a reconsideration  of the role of the marginal
cost of funds.  Both arise from the changed  circumstances  in which project evaluation is
to be practiced. We first describe  these  changes  and then move to the specifics  of our two
proposals.
Changed  Circumstances.  When Little and Mirrlees wrote their book governments
were  expanding  public  investment  rapidly  and7huch  of that investment  was in industry  and
related  sectors. Indeed  the first version  of their book published  in 1969 was titled Manual
of Industnal  Project  Analysis. At that  time major  distortions  arising from trade policy and
exchange  rate policy  were characteristic  of most developing  economies  (see for example
Little,  Scitovsky,  and Scott, 1970). It is not surprising  therefore that an important  focus
for Little and Mirrlees was on techniques  -- especially the use of border prices and
conversion  factors  -- that  addressed  these concerns.
Moving into the second half of the 1990s, these concerns remain but in a much
reduced form.  Many countries are now grappling with the privatization of public
enterprises  rather than  with new investment,  and reforms  of trade policy and exchange  rate
systems have reduced the distortions  of most concern to Little and Mirrlees.  In these
circumstances,  it may  well be that  the modest  attention  paid by the World Bank to sectoral
conversion  factors is a sensible  allocation  of the time of economists. On the other hand,
more  attention  should  be paid to the basic question  of whether a project ought to be in the
public  sector  or not.  As we have  noted,  the composition  of the World Bank's portfolio  has11
shifted to more emphasis on basic infrastructure, social services, and environmental
projects for which the rationale  for public-sector  provision is strong.  But, there are still
many projects entering  the portfolio  that could well be shifted to the private sector.
At the same time, the importance of macroeconomic  stability is now widely
accepted  as a prerequisite  for sustained  development.  And  a prudent  fiscal policy is central
to macroeconomic  stability. It follows  that  projects  that  place a burden on the budget have
to be reviewed with care.  Fiscal balance will require that the budgetary  costs of these
projects be recouped  through some other tax instrument, which in turn will introduce
distortionary  costs somewhere  in the econorn9. These costs ought to be included in the
evaluation of the project which was of course precisely the original rationale for the
marginal  cost of public  funds. Moreover,  as the composition  of projects shifts in favor of
those  with a clear public sector rationale, we can expect that an increasing  proportion of
projects will be characterized  by public costs and private benefits (see below).  In these
circumstances,  the need for a careful assessment  of budgetary impact  and. in turn, of the
distortionary  cost of alternative  sources of revenue will become greater.
Public-Private  Choice. These  changes  -- greater  scrutiny  of what types of activities
ought  to be undertaken  by the public  sector  and the emergence  of a more rational exchange
rate and tariff structure  -- render the few aspects  of the Little-Mirrlees  approach that are
practiced at the World Bank less important.  Indeed, instead of a concern with the
calculation of the rate of return for a public-sector  project, interest is now focussed  on
whether a project ought to be in the public sector at all.  However, the principles
underlying Little-Mirrlees,  not to mention  other manuals on project evaluation (UNIDO
[19721,  Squire  and van der Tak (19751),  can be applied to the changed circumstances  and12
new set of questions about the appropriate role of government.  In particular, all the
approaches  to  cost-benefit analysis require  the  project  evaluator  to  specify  the
counterfactual:  what would the world have looked like in the absence of the project? This
principle is relevant  whenever  there is a private sector alternative  to public provision.
To illustrate, assume that the government  is contemplating  an investment  which
produces private goods -- a shoe factory, say.  One possible judgement regarding the
counterfactual is that, in the absence of the public sector project, nothing would have
happened. In this case, the analyst  should focus on a comparison  of the costs incurred by
the  project and the benefits it is expected(to yield.  The use of border prices and
conversion  factors would obviously be relevant.  Assuming  that the evaluation  points to
a positive net present value (NPV), the project would be accepted.  But the appropriate
counterfactual  might be that the private sector would have produced the shoes anyway
(assuming  the enterprise is profitable).  In this case, the relevant magnitude is the net
contribution of the public shoe factory.  The NPV of the public sector project over and
above that of the private sector project (evaluated  at shadow  prices) may well be zero.'
While the shoe factory case may seem obvious, there are many World Bank
projects where a private sector alternative appears feasible and yet no private-sector
counterfactual was specified. A quick survey of the titles of projects approved by the
World Bank's Board  of Directors  indicates  that only 13 percent could be said to have an
obvious  public sector rationale  while many others seemed to have a strong  private-sector
characteristic (see Table I for examples).  Of course, the titles of projects are not an
adequate basis for arriving at a definitive  judgement, but it can reasonably  be concluded
that there is a need to consider the private-sector  counterfactual  more systematically.13
Furthermore, the 1995 report notes that "In many cases,  it was not possible to discern the
with and without  project situation on the basis of the information provided"  in the appraisal
report quite apart from whether a private sector alternative was considered (World Bank,
1995, p.  15).
Table 1: Sample of IBRD and IDA Projects with Clear v Unclear Public Component: 1994
Org.  Country  Project  Title  Amount
Projects with Clear Public Component  SM
IBRD  Algeria  Emergency Desert Locust Control Project  30.0
Brazil  AIDS and  STD Control  160.0
China  Shanghai Environment  160.0
Indonesia  Dame Safety Project  55.0
Jamaica  Tax Administration Reform  13.2
Mexico  Second Primary Education  412.0
Morocco  Environrnental Management  6.0
Peru  Basic Health and Nutrition  34.0
IDA  Chad  Health and Safe Motherhood  18.5
Gambia  Capacity Building for Environmental Management  2.6
India  Maharashtra Erergency  Earthquake Rehab  246.0
Uganda  Sexually Transmnitted  Infections Project  50.0
Projects with Unclear Public Component
IBRD  Bulgaria  Water Companies Restructuring and Modernization  98.0
China  Telecomnunications Project  250.0
India  Container Transport Logistics Project  94.0
Korea  Financial Intermediation Project  100.0
Malaysia  Second Rubber Industry Smaliholders Dev. Auth.  70.0
Papua New Guinea  Petroleum Exploration and Development Tech. Asst.  11.0
Philippines  Leyte-Luzon Geothermal Project  113.0
Romania  Industrial Development Project  175.0
Tunisia  Private Investment Credit Project  50.0
IDA  Madagascar  Petroleum Sector Reform Project  51.9
Mozambique  Gas Engineering Project  30.0
Uganda  Cotton  Subsector Development Project  14.0
Total  1994 IBRD and IDA Loans and Credits  20,836.0
IBRD and  IDA Projects  with  Clear  Public Component  2,747.3
Percentage  of Total Loans and Credits  with Clear  Public Component  13.2%
To  be  sure,  specifying  the  private-sector  counterfactual  is  not  always
straightforward.  Yet, some principles can be invoked.  First,  if the project is producing
a private good and is profitable at market prices so that there is good reason to believe the14
private  sector  will undertake  it, then the difference  between the factual  and counterfactual
should  be zero. In this case  there is no advantage  to having  the project in the public sector
and the point can probably be established  without a serious evaluation. 2 Second, at the
other  extreme  we have  the case  of pure public goods. Here there is no prospect of private
provision and hence no need to worry about a private-sector  counterfactual. But pure
public goods -- defense, for example -- are relatively rare.  And, third we have the case
of market  failure  arising  from externalities,  indivisibilities,  information  failures, etc.  Here
there  may be a case  for government  intervention,  but the private-sector  counterfactual  will
not necessarily  be zero. Since  this  is the case  which is likely to be most relevant to World
Bank projects, we consider it in more detail.
When  we have  a market  failure arising from say a positive externality, the private
sector will provide some of the good, but not the socially  optimal amount. In Figure 4,
which is drawn for non-tradeables,  the positive externality is captured by the marginal
social benefit (MSB) curve lying above the marginal private benefit (MPB) curve.  An
example  would  be secondary  education, which  many would claim has significant  positive
externalities, although private secondary schools exist alongside public ones in many
countries. In Figure  4, the private sector would provide up to q* of the good on its own.
The socially  optimal  amount, however, is q**.  (In the shoe factory example referred to
earlier, the MSB and MPB curves  coincide, so that q* = q**.)
In evaluating  projects in sectors such as these,  the analyst needs to establish  two
points. First, that  public  provision  results  in a greater supply  of the good than would have
occunred  with  just private sector provision (that is,  overall supply should exceed q*).  If
this were not the case, public provision  would simply  be crowding out private providers.15
Figure  4: Public  Provision  and the Prvate Sector  Counterfactual
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The private-sector  counterfactual  would be equal to the project (assuming  costs are the
sarme)  and the NPV of the public  sector  project would  be zero.  Second, we should ensure
that the project  does not result  in total supply  of the good beyond q** (that  is, beyond the
point where  marginal  costs exceed  marginal  social benefits). Thus, the relevant range for
public  provision  in this sector  is between  q* and q**.  We deal with the former (q*) here
because it bears on the issue of the private sector counter factual and confront the latter
(q**) in our discussion  of the marginal  cost of funds.
Determining  q*, an unobserved  counterfactual,  is difficult but it may be feasible
in many  cases  to arrive at an estimate  using information  on willingness-to-pay. Appraisal
of the Leyte-Luzon Geothermal  Project in the Philippines, a US$ 1.3 billion project,
illustrates  the idea. The economic  analysis  of this project  includes  an estimate of consumer
willingiess-to-pay  based  on current  bulk energy  tariffs in the Luzon system.  In turn, this16
allows an assessment of what the private sector would have provided  and determines the
minimum  level of public sector supply.  And as we shall see next it also has important
implications for tariff policy.'
Revisiting the Marginal Cost of Funds.  The marginal cost of funds highlights the
need to ensure  that public sector projects attempt to recover as much of their  costs as
possible from the private sector (i.e.,  that an appropriate pricing strategy accompany the
project's implementation).  In Figure 5, we draw again on the Geothermal Project in the
Philippines  to show how a project's  internal rate of return (IRR) changes with different
pricing policies and different levels of the mltginal  cost of funds.  We calculate the IRR
of  the  project  for different  values of the marginal cost  of funds and  different  pricing
policies.  If the electricity is sold at its market value and/or there is no premium on public
income (i.e.,  the marginal cost of funds is one), the IRR for the project is 10.5 percent.
But any other combination of pricing policy and premium would result in a substantially
lower IRR.  In the extreme case, when the electricity is sold at 40 percent of the market
price,  and the premium is 100 percent (i.e.,  the marginal cost of funds is two), the IRR
drops  to 4.3  percent,  or by 60 percent.  In value terms (at a  10% discount rate),  the
project's  NPV drops from over $29 million to -$645 million.
In the case of this power project  it is reasonable to expect that full cost recovery
is the appropriate goal, the rationale for public provision presumably being the size and
indivisible  nature  of  the project  which  make  private  provision  difficult.  Thus,  the
premium  may  not  be especially critical  except  as a  reminder  that  less than  full cost
recovery imposes distortionary costs elsewhere in the economy.  But, for many of those
projects  with a reasonable case for public intervention -- basic infrastructure,  primary17
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education,  rural health,  and so on --  full cost recovery is not likely to be a desirable goal.
Thus, these projects will share a common  characteristic: costs are borne by the public
sector, benefits  are enjoyed  by the private sector.  If there is a premium on public income
(which is almost always the case, since governmnents  resort to distortionary  taxation for
revenue),  then the net present value of these projects will be lower than otherwise
calculated. Put another  way, since  the World Bankc  has not used a premium (that is public
costs  and private  benefits  are treated  equally), it has systematically  overestimated  the NPV
of these  projects  (see Squire, 1989).18
Consider  again Figure 4.  To the extent that there is a premium,  the fact that the
government  suffers a fiscal cost (and hence a real cost implied by the need to generate
revenue  through  some other means) causes the overall cost  of the project  to increase,
shifting the MC curve upward to MC'.  The optimal supply will now be at a level below
q**,  call  it q**'.  What is the relationship between this optimal supply  level and the
decision  to  accept  or  reject  the  project'?  We  would  reject  projects  in  the  interval
(q**',q**)  even if they recovered costs up to the private sector's  willingness to pay.
Of course,  the analyst will never know the exact value of the externality.  It is,
however,  possible  to estimate the cost assdcSated with raising revenue  from the  least-
distortionary  tax  instrument.  Estimates for developed countries  range  from 32 to  47
percent in the U.S. to 120 percent in Sweden.  Browning [1987] discusses four key factors
that interact to determine the marginal welfare cost and account for the wide variation in
estimates.  These  include  the elasticity  of  labor supply;  the marginal  tax rate;  how
(balanced-budget)  government  spending  affects  actual  labor  earnings;'  and  the
progressivity of the change in the tax structure that produces the incremental tax revenue.'
In developing countries,  the marginal cost of funds is likely to  be even higher to the
extent that these countries have access to a more limited set of tax instruments (e.g.,  trade
taxes in low-income countries) which are highly distorting.  On the other hand,  if as some
believe,  substitution elasticities are lower in developing countries,  the deadweight loss
from taxation will also be lower.  Even in the absence of country-specific estimates, we
suggest  that it is still worth showing the net impact of the project on the government's
budget and conducting sensitivity analysis for a plausible range of the marginal cost of
funds.19
III.  IMPROVING  PROJECT QUALITY  INDIRECTLY
Focussing on rates of return or the immediate economic analysis of projects is one
means and presumably an important one of improving the quality of projects.  But other
approaches may be as or more important.  HIere  we examine two possibilities.  The first
is the positive counterpoint to the earlier observation that a concern with macroeconomic
and  structural  reforms diluted the  time and effort devoted  to project  evaluation.  The
consequent improvement in policy may have affected project performance positively.  And
the second  emphasizes  the importance of  sector studies,  the existence of which  may
improve  the quality of future projects in tharsector.  In the following we explore both
possibilities,  offering some empirical evidence in each case.
The Policy Environment.  To investigate the relationship between rates of return
and the policy environment, Kaufmann (1991) looked at 1,200 World Bank projects in 58
developing  countries.  He linked the reestimated rate of return with various  indices of
policy-related  distortions. The broad pattem is shown in Table 2: the lower the distortion,
the higher  the project's  rate of  return.  This pattern  is confirmed  by his econometric
estimation  (which further controlled for country-specific factors, external shocks, etc.).
For most of the policy distortions, a large change in the index is associated with a 3 to 7
percentage point difference in the rate of return.  Furthermore,  he showed that countries
which moved from high to low distortions significantly improved the rate of return to their
projects.20
Table  2:  Economic Policies  and the Performance  of Projects
Percent Unsatisfactory
Policy Distortion  Average  ERR  (Social  Sector Projects)
Trade  Restrictions
Highly  restrictive  13.20  28.10
Nonrestrictive  19.00  0.00
Exchange Rate
Highly  overvalued  8.20  37.00
Slightly  overvalued  17.70  17.40
Real Interest  Rate
Negative  15.00  29.40
Positive  17.30  17.50
Fiscal  Deficit
High  13.40  29.30
Low  17.80  11.30
Price Distortions  of Tradeables
High  distonions  15.80  25.70
Low distortions  17.40  14.80
Source:  Kaufmann  (1991);  Kaufmann  and  Wang  (199S).
These results are both troubling and reassuring.  They are troubling insofar as
project evaluation techniques  are in principle supposed  to  incorporate existing policy
distortions.  Had the shadow prices for these projects been properly calculated, and
appropriate project selection  criteria followed, there should be no relationship  between
policies  and rates  of return.  However, as we have seen, these techniques  were used only
on a limited basis.  What these results indicate is that the "costs" of not calculating  the
proper shadow  prices  are greater  the more distorted  is the economy. As such this confirns
the appropriateness  of the original  Little  and Mirrlees focus on key distortions  and, by the
same token,  our suggestions  to reconsider  the emphasis  in a changed world.  At the same
time, the Kaufmann  results  are reassuring  in that the World Bank's increased  emphasis  on21
policy reform  (possibly at the expense of better project  analysis) may have yielded  an
unintended benefit: better returns on projects.
Kaufmann and Wang (1995) undertook a similar analysis for social-sector projects,
where  instead  of rates of return (which are not usually calculated for projects in these
sectors), they use an ex post measure of the project's  "success".  Again, they find that the
severity  of the  various distortions has a significant effect  on project  success  with the
percentage of unsatisfactory projects typically  doubling as one moves from a low-distortion
to a high distortion environment (see the second column in Table 2).
Sectoral Anathsis.  The World Bank rdctinely carries out economic and sector work
(ESW) on its client countries.  Some recent econometric work (Schneider,  1995) shows
that the number of ESW reports on a country or sector contributes significantly to project
success in that country/sector.,  The percentage of successful projects (as determined by
the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department at project completion) rises from 69 to  100
when the number of ESW reports  increases from zero to four or more (see Figure  6).
Schneider's  econometric results confirm that this relationship is statistically significant.
Controlling for other factors, he concludes that one ESW report in a particular country and
sector increases the probability of a project's success by nine percentage points,  while two
reports would increase it by sixteen points.22
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Included  in the Bank's ESW  are reviews  of public  expenditures  in particular  sectors
or the country as a whole.  The reviews can be. and in some cases have been, used to
inform project selection in the country or sector.  These sectoral reviews are important
because project-specific  appraisal reports can  (at best) only assess the rate of return or
acceptability  of the project being appraised. This is problematical  for two reasons both
of which  are especially  important  for multilateral  lending  agencies. First, the project being
appraised  may have  been  undertaken  without  external  linancing  from a multilateral  agency.
In this case, the external funding  is actually financing  some ui.hzr  project which without
the financing would not have been in the investment  program.  This problem arises
because financial resources  are fungible at least to some extent.  It is unlikely that the23
projects  evaluated  by the Bank  are those  marginal  projects  which  would otherwise  have not
occurred. For the 99 projects  it evaluated  in 1993, the Operations  Evaluation Department
found  an average  economic  rate of return of 21% (World  Bank, 1994).This  average rate
of return  appears  too high to indicate marginal  projects. And second, even if the project
would not have been in the investment program without external funding, there is no
guarantee  that it is the best of all those projects not currently in the program because of
lack  of financing. Yet  the latter  is the relevant  question if the World Bank is to maximize
the development  impact  of its lending.
The above  argument  calls  for sector-wlde  reviews  prior to project-specific  appraisal
and financing  and perhaps  explains  an irnportant  part of the observed link between sectoral
analysis  and subsequent  project success. To illustrate  consider two examples of sectoral
public expenditure reviews (PERs).  The Agricultural Expenditure Review of India
(Pradhan  and Pillai-Essex,  1993) examined  several agricultural  programs as projects and
calculated their economic rate of return.  It concluded  that two programs -- a fertilizer
subsidy and a crop production  scheme -- had a zero rate of return because there was no
justification for public provision of these goods (the benefits accrued directly to the
individual  farmers). Yet, the bulk of central-government  expenditures  were going to these
two  schemes. The sLudy  also pointed  to the high rates of return in groundwater  irrigation
and extension services, recommending  a reorientation of public expenditures in that
direction. Similarly,  an Infrastructure  Public Expenditure  Review  of Peru (Humplick and
Paterson,  1994)  calculated  the economic  rate  of return  of expanding  each of the major road
links in Peru. The results  showed  a large variation  in the IRR.  Using a cutoff rate of 1224
percent,  the report  was able to recommend dropping  several road expansion projects,
leading to a $275 million reduction in the government's  road investment program.
These reviews actually go beyond setting a good foundation for subsequent project
appraisal  --  they also improve the overall quality  of the sectoral investment program.
Moreover,  if the result is a satisfactory program,  then the specific project financed and
appraised  in depth by the World Bank becomes le.i  important. Rather, the Bank could
have  the  greatest development  impact by associating liself withl that project  where  its
knowledge and technical expertise is likely to be of most value.  Alternatively,  the World
Bank could finance a time-slice of an agreed stctoral expenditure program, an option that
is receiving greater attention in the Bank.
Furthermore,  sectoral expenditure reviews  can shed  light on the two  elements
which  we have identified as crucial  for project  evaluation  in  the  1990s, namely,  the
private-sector  counterfactual  and  the  marginal  cost  of  funds.  In  reviewinc  the
government's expenditure program within a sector, a sectoral expenditure review should
identify areas where the private sector is providing, or can provide, the goods and scrvices
in question.  For instance, a review of public expenditures in the health sector of Malaysia
(World Bank,  1992) noted that 62 percent of spending by the Ministry of Health was on
medical care (mostly private goods) and  only 23 percent was on public heaith while the
latter had a higher marginal impact on health status. 7 While sectoral expenditure reviews
would not calculate the premium on public income, PERs that cover the entire goverrunent
budget  could  in  principle  do  so,  insofar  as  they  evaluate  the  government's  budget
constraint  as part of  the macroeconomic framework.  At the very least,  PERs  should25
identify  those  countries  where  the gains  from applying  the marginal  cost of funds in project
evaluation -- or the losses from not doing so -- are the greatest.
IV.  CONCLUSION
To some extent, the changed circumstances  noted above vindicate the relatively
limited attention the World Bank  has paid to project appraisal. At the same time those
changed  circumstances  have  pointed  to new priorities and raised old concerns that are not
adequately addressed at present.  In two areas we conclude that continuation  of current
practice with in one case some tightening  on quality seems appropriate:
*  Distributional Weights.  The view ttmt other instruments, especially the broad
allocation of  public expenditures and  tax policy,  are  able to  influence the
distribution of income more efficiently than project selection, coupled with the
practical  difficulties  of identifying  income-specific  project beneficiaries  leads to the
conclusion that it is not worth revisiting the issue of distributional weights.
Shadow Prices.  The use of border prices, a  discount rate, and a  standard
conversion factor should be routine practice.  Given the Kaufmann  results, this
point is especially important  where economy-wide  distortions remain significant.
In addition,  where  the yes-no  decision  proves sensitive  to the value of the standard
conversion factor, further disaggregation  -- sectoral conversion factors  -- would be
required.
More importantly,  we suggest  on the basis of this review that there are three areas
where  the World Bank  should  think seriously  about improving  its analysis in the interests
of both its development  impact  and the quality of its portfolio:26
*  Public versus Private.  In as much as the World Bank is still financing projects that
appear to be producing private goods, a greater effort should be made to assess the
feasibility of private sector alternatives, including those that would prevail under
regulatory  or price (tax-cum-subsidy) policies.  And even where there is a clear
rationale for public provision, care should be taken to ensure that public provision
results in a greater (that is, closer to optimal) supply than would be the case with
just private provision.
*  Marginal  Cost of Funds.  Because the World Bank is likely to be  financing an
increasing number of projects that aM characterized by public costs and private
benefits,  the idea of incorporating the marginal cost of public  funds in project
appraisal  should be  reconsidered.  Ideally,  this should  entail estimation  of the
marginal cost of funds at least in countries where the World Bank is investing in
several projects or where it  is likely to be especially large -- a task that could be
most  appropriately  undertaken  by the Research Department.  Finally,  for all
projects,  whether it is possible to calculate a rate of return or not, and whether a
country-specific  estimate of the marginal cost of funds is available or  not,  the
analyst should measure the impact of the project on the budget and explain what
forms of cost recovery have been considered.
*  Public Expenditure Reviews.  Wherever possible, the World Bank should allocate
resources  to reviews of sectoral expenditure programs before embarking  on the
appraisal and financing of specific projects.  Indeed, if a sectoral review has been
undertaken, financing a time-slice of the program may be the most effective use of
World Bank funds.27
If  history  is any  guide,  proposals such as these are unlikely  to make much  headway
without a change in the structure of internal incentives.  At a minirnum, a reinstatement
of a central projects unit to both provide assistance to project analysts and exert a degree
of quality control would seem to be required.
ENDNOTES
1.  Furthermore,  if there  is any added  distortion  from the public  sector's need to raise funds,  the
return  to the public  investment  will  be negative.
2.  If the  good  is  private  but is not  currently  produced  privately,  then  one would  need to compare
public provision  with  salc of project  description  (e.g., blueprints)  to the private sector.
3.  Alternatively,  it may be argued  that the current level  of private-sector  provision  represents
the  profit-maximizing  amount  given  the  costs  imposc by, inter  alia, government-induced  distortions.
Then  the  appropriate  comparison  should  be between  the net  benefits  of the project and removing  those
distortions.
4.  If the government  provides  a service  that taxpayers  would  have  otherwise  purchased  on their
own,  then  the spending  would  be a perfect substitute  for disposable  income. By  contrast. if marginal
government  spending  provides  no benefits  to taxpayers,  there is an income  effect from the balanced
budget  spending  operation  that counters  the substitution  effect (Browning,  p. 18).
5.  The more progressive  the tax change, the greater the marginal welfare cost.  Raising
additional  revenue  by increasing  the rates  of progressive  taxes  (e.g., federal income  taxes)  implies
large increases  in marginal  tax rates (Browning,  p. 19).
6.  The study reviewed  431 projects for which Project Completion  Reports assigned ratings
during the period  July 1992  - October  1994.
7.  Regression  analysis  of infant mortality  on various types of public medical  expenditures
showed  that  expenditures  on safe  water  and immunization  had  a much  higher impact  than expenditures
on public-provided  doctors.28
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